Advisory · CVE-2026-116086
Konflux CI workflow filter injection leaks secrets into logs
An attacker with permission to trigger automated Konflux workflow runs can inject malicious filter commands through crafted issue titles, exposing API credentials, deployment keys, and internal notes in workflow logs.
- Vendor
- Konflux
- Product
- Konflux CI
- Identifier / CWE
- CVE-2026-116086
CWE-94 - Action timing
- Immediate
Explain it like I’m five
The build system copies whatever title you type on an issue straight into its search box without checking it. A crafted title turns that search box into a way to pull secrets out and print them in the log.
- 01Workflow triggered
An attacker with permission to trigger automated workflow runs supplies a crafted issue title.
- 02Title flows into a query
A workflow script incorporates the user-provided title directly into a data query without adequate sanitization.
- 03Filter commands injected
The crafted title injects malicious filter commands into the query.
- 04Secrets returned
Sensitive information such as API credentials, deployment keys, and internal notes returned from repository queries is exposed.
- 05Exposure lands in logs
The sensitive data appears in workflow logs, where it can be read by anyone with log access.
What happened
A flaw in Konflux CI lets an attacker with permission to trigger automated workflow runs cause information disclosure by providing crafted issue titles to workflow scripts. The affected script incorporates user-provided titles directly into data queries without adequate sanitization, allowing the attacker to inject malicious filter commands, so sensitive information such as API credentials, deployment keys, and internal notes returned from repository queries may be exposed in workflow logs. NVD rates it CVSS 3.1 8.8 (CWE-94), and lists versions 0.2.2 and 0.2.3-rc.0 as affected.
Red Hat rates the issue Important and notes that authenticated users with workflow dispatch permissions can inject arbitrary filter syntax into query utilities, potentially exposing repository metadata and deployment secrets in CI logs, while operational impact is limited to information disclosure within pipeline logging. Red Hat also states that no mitigation meets its criteria, and no fixed release is stated in the sources checked, so none is claimed here.
What to do
- Limit who can trigger automated workflow runs, especially dispatch events that accept user-supplied issue parameters.
- Review workflow logs for crafted issue titles, unusual filter syntax, and unexpected credential or key material.
- Rotate any API credentials, deployment keys, or secrets that could have been returned into logs.
- Treat CI logs as sensitive data and restrict who can read them until the flaw is fixed.
- Track the vendor fix and apply it when released, then re-check logs for residual secret material.
Management note
The precondition is a permission, not a vulnerability in itself, so the fastest control is access: fewer people able to trigger runs means fewer people able to pull secrets into logs. Pair that with rotation, because anything already printed in a log is already exposed.