Advisory · CVE-2026-129948
Contentlayer runs JavaScript hidden in frontmatter during builds
Contentlayer's Markdown parser still has its JavaScript engine enabled, so a ---js frontmatter block in a content file executes code during the build, exposing CI secrets. No fix exists; the project is unmaintained.
- Vendor
- Contentlayer
- Product
- @contentlayer/source-files
- Identifier / CWE
- CVE-2026-129948
CWE-95 - Action timing
- Immediate
Explain it like I’m five
Contentlayer reads the little header at the top of each Markdown file, and that reader still understands JavaScript. A content file that starts with a special JavaScript marker runs code while the site is being built, with access to everything the build can see.
- 01Attacker controls a content file
An attacker who can add or edit content files starts a Markdown or MDX file with a ---js or ---javascript frontmatter delimiter.
- 02Build parses the file
Contentlayer's parseMarkdown() hands the frontmatter to gray-matter with its JavaScript engine still enabled.
- 03Embedded code runs
The JavaScript in the frontmatter executes during the build, in the same environment as the build process.
- 04Secrets exposed
Code running in CI can read build secrets, environment variables, and tokens available to the build job.
What happened
Contentlayer’s @contentlayer/source-files through version 0.3.4 contains a code injection vulnerability. Attackers who control content files can execute JavaScript by abusing gray-matter’s still-enabled JavaScript engine in parseMarkdown(). Starting a Markdown or MDX file with a —js or —javascript frontmatter delimiter runs the embedded code during the build, exposing CI build secrets. The issue is rated CVSS 8.7.
The project is unmaintained, NVD marks the CVE as unsupported-when-assigned, and no fixed release exists. There is no version to upgrade to; the only defenses are controlling who can contribute content and moving off the project.
What to do
- Restrict who can add or edit content files in any repository built with Contentlayer, and review content contributed by outside parties before it reaches a build.
- Scan content repositories for files starting with —js or —javascript frontmatter delimiters.
- Audit CI logs and secret usage for builds that processed untrusted content, and rotate any build secrets that may have been exposed.
- Plan migration off Contentlayer to a maintained content layer, since no patch is coming for this or future issues in the project.
- Until migration is complete, run builds with least-privilege credentials and avoid giving build jobs access to production secrets.
Management note
This one reaches CI directly: a malicious content file can run code inside the build and walk away with its secrets. If your site takes content from contributors, treat this as a supply-chain exposure and rotate build credentials after checking what ran.