Advisory · CVE-2026-129956
Sandboxie-Plus privilege escalation reaches SYSTEM through a signed-process trick
A standard Windows user can escalate to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM by injecting code into a signed Sandboxie process and abusing SbieSvc's trusted-caller check to launch the updater as SYSTEM. Fixed in Sandboxie-Plus 1.18.6.
- Vendor
- Sandboxie-Plus
- Product
- Sandboxie-Plus
- Identifier / CWE
- CVE-2026-129956
CWE-269 - Action timing
- Immediate
Explain it like I’m five
Sandboxie-Plus has a helper service that runs as SYSTEM and trusts any process wearing a Sandboxie uniform. An attacker slips their own code into a signed Sandboxie program, asks the service to run the updater, and the service hands them a SYSTEM-level process.
- 01Find a signed process
A standard user locates a running signed Sandboxie process such as SandMan.exe, which runs under their own account.
- 02Inject code
The attacker injects a DLL into that process using CreateRemoteThread, which needs no admin rights for a process they own.
- 03Abuse the trusted-caller check
The injected code connects to the SbieSvc LPC port, which accepts any local process, and the service's signature check passes because the host process is a legitimately signed Sandboxie binary.
- 04SYSTEM process spawned
Sending MSGID_PROCESS_RUN_UPDATER with elevate=2 makes SbieSvc duplicate its SYSTEM token and launch UpdUtil.exe as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
- 05Full control
The attacker now runs code as SYSTEM, able to install persistent backdoors, read all user data, and disable security software.
What happened
A local privilege escalation vulnerability in Sandboxie-Plus was disclosed with a working proof of concept, confirmed on version 1.18.5. The SbieSvc service exposes an LPC port with a NULL DACL, so any local process can connect to it, and its caller check verifies only the main executable image of the calling process, not the code actually making the request.
An attacker injects code into a signed Sandboxie process running under their own account, such as SandMan.exe. When the injected code sends a MSGID_PROCESS_RUN_UPDATER message with elevate=2, the signature check passes and SbieSvc duplicates its SYSTEM token to launch UpdUtil.exe as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The advisory rates the issue at CVSS 8.5 and notes it was reproduced twice on separate processes.
Versions before 1.18.6 are affected. Sandboxie-Plus 1.18.6 is the fixed release.
What to do
- Upgrade Sandboxie-Plus to version 1.18.6 or later on all Windows systems where it is installed.
- Check for unexpected UpdUtil.exe processes running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, especially ones started outside a normal update flow.
- Review Windows event and Sysmon logs for unusual DLL injection into Sandboxie processes and for LPC connections to SbieSvc from unexpected callers.
- Treat any host where a suspicious SYSTEM-level UpdUtil.exe was observed as potentially compromised and investigate for persistence before returning it to service.
- Where upgrades cannot happen immediately, limit who can run Sandboxie-Plus on shared or sensitive machines and monitor for the injection behavior described above.
Management note
This is a local privilege escalation, not a remote exploit, but the bar is low: any standard user on a machine with Sandboxie-Plus running can reach SYSTEM with no admin rights and no user interaction. The fix is a version bump, so prioritize patching shared workstations and any machine where Sandboxie-Plus runs alongside sensitive data or credentials.