Advisory · CVE-2026-130683
SiYuan admin file copy can write shell startup files
SiYuan before 3.8.10 omits shell-initialization files from its sensitive-path deny-list, letting an authenticated administrator copy files outside the workspace to locations that execute on the next shell or login.
- Vendor
- SiYuan
- Product
- SiYuan
- Identifier / CWE
- CVE-2026-130683
CWE-22 - Action timing
- Immediate
Explain it like I’m five
SiYuan has a list of places admins are not allowed to copy files to, but the list forgot shell startup files. An admin can copy a booby-trapped file into one of those spots, and it runs the next time the user opens a terminal or logs in.
- 01Copy request
An authenticated administrator calls /api/file/copyFile with an absolute destination outside the workspace.
- 02Deny-list gap
The IsSensitivePath deny-list omits shell-initialization files such as .zshenv and .bash_profile, as well as the local data directory.
- 03Payload written
The payload is written to the chosen location outside the workspace.
- 04Execution on login
The payload executes as the user on the next shell or login.
What happened
SiYuan before 3.8.10 uses an incomplete deny-list in IsSensitivePath that omits shell-initialization files such as .zshenv and .bash_profile, as well as the user’s local data directory. Authenticated administrators can call /api/file/copyFile with an absolute destination outside the workspace to write payloads there, which execute as the user on the next shell or login.
The GitHub security advisory rates it critical at CVSS 9.3 under CVSS 4.0. SiYuan 3.8.10 fixes the flaw.
What to do
- Inventory SiYuan deployments and review who holds administrator access.
- Upgrade to SiYuan 3.8.10 or later using the project release guidance.
- Review shell-initialization files and the local data directory on hosts running SiYuan for unexpected content.
- Audit file-copy API calls for destinations outside the workspace.
- Remove any suspicious payloads and rotate credentials if a host was affected.
Management note
This is an administrator-abuse path, so it matters most where admin access is broad or shared. The upgrade closes the gap; the host check is what confirms nothing was planted before it.