Act nowDisclosed

Advisory · CVE-2026-134287

OpenRemote MQTT provisioning flaw lets unauthenticated attackers impersonate devices

OpenRemote core before 1.34.0 lets unauthenticated attackers impersonate provisioned devices over MQTT by publishing a known device's public certificate, gaining the device's service account to read and modify assets. The project rates it critical at CVSS 4.0 9.2.

Vendor
OpenRemote
Product
OpenRemote
Identifier / CWE
CVE-2026-134287
CWE-287
Action timing
Immediate
ELI5

Explain it like I’m five

Devices prove who they are with a private key, like a secret handshake. The check-in desk only asked to see the public badge, so anyone holding a copy of a device's badge can walk in as that device.

SIMPLIFIED_ATTACK_PATH04 STEPS
  1. 01Public certificate obtained

    The attacker obtains a provisioned device's public certificate, which is not a secret.

  2. 02Provisioning request

    The attacker publishes that certificate to the MQTT provisioning request topic from an anonymous connection.

  3. 03Authentication bypass

    The UserAssetProvisioningMQTTHandler authenticates the connection as the device's service account without proof of private key possession.

  4. 04Device impersonated

    The attacker can read and modify the device's assets as if they were the device itself.

What happened

OpenRemote disclosed CVE-2026-134287 on November 21, 2026: an authentication bypass in the UserAssetProvisioningMQTTHandler of OpenRemote core before 1.34.0. The project rates it critical at CVSS 4.0 9.2 (CVSS 3.1 7.7).

Unauthenticated attackers can impersonate provisioned devices without proof of private key possession. By publishing a known device’s public certificate to the provisioning request topic, an attacker authenticates an anonymous MQTT connection as the device’s service account and can read and modify its assets.

OpenRemote 1.34.0 is unaffected. All earlier releases are affected. The flaw only matters where the MQTT provisioning endpoint is reachable, which is the normal deployment shape for an IoT platform.

What to do

  1. Inventory OpenRemote deployments and identify every instance running a release before 1.34.0.
  2. Upgrade affected instances to OpenRemote 1.34.0 or later.
  3. Until patched, restrict MQTT access to trusted networks and devices, and monitor the provisioning topic for unexpected requests.
  4. Review MQTT and provisioning logs for anonymous connections authenticated as device service accounts.
  5. Audit asset changes on provisioned devices for modifications that did not come from the real device.
  6. Confirm the deployed version after upgrading.

Management note

Device identity is the trust boundary for an IoT platform, and this flaw lets anyone with a copy of a public certificate cross it with no secret at all. Public certificates circulate widely by design, so assume the precondition is met. Patching is the priority, and provisioning logs will show whether any device was impersonated.